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SUMMARY
This thesis outlines the design and implementation of a framework for automating
the process of building virtual test environments for security research. It discusses the
metadata needed to fully reproduce identical environments on separate host systems. A
software library capable of building such environments from this metadata, and performing
tests within these environments, is implemented. Finally, the capabilities of this tool are




To demonstrate working exploits or vulnerabilities, people often share their findings as a
form of proof-of-concept (PoC) prototype on online forums or community websites. For
exploit authors, such demonstrations are a great vehicle to bring their fame, and in general,
these are useful, lively resources for others to learn about real vulnerabilities and state-of-the-
art exploitation techniques. Unfortunately, the shared PoC exploits are seldom reproducible,
in part because they are often not thoroughly tested, but largely because authors lack a
formal way to specify the tested environment and its dependencies. For example, Figure 1
shows a typical practice of describing dependencies and tested environments when sharing a
PoC exploit on community websites (e.g., https://exploit-db.com). To demonstrate
that the shared exploit is working, the author often shares three logical aspects of the exploit
along with the exploit itself: tested environments and dependencies; execution method and
possible configuration; and validation to check a successful exploitation.
This example code snippet shows a PoC exploit attacking the GHOST vulnerability [1].
The GHOST vulnerability, officially known as CVE-2015-0235, is a buffer overflow bug
in the gethostbyname() function of glibc, which was introduced in November, 2000 [40].
Although the GHOST bug had existed for over three years, it was hard to replicate when the
bug was announced. Not only does it require a specific version of glibc (from glibc-2.2
up to glibc-2.17), but, at the time that it was announced, all distributions had already
dynamically updated or fixed the bug in their main package repositories, requiring testers
to roll back their version of glibc. Therefore, to reproduce the public GHOST exploit,
one needs to replace the system-wide glibc library, which may end up requiring the re-
installation of numerous packages in order to resolve the cascading dependencies.
1
# Exploit Title:  [Exim ESMTP GHOST DoS PoC Exploit]
# Date:           [1/29/2015]
# Exploit Author: [1N3]
# Vendor Homepage:[www.exim.org]
# Version:        [4.80 or less]
# Tested on:      [debian-7-7-64b]
# CVE:            [2015-0235]
#!/usr/bin/python
# Exim ESMTP DoS Exploit by 1N3 v20150128
# CVE-2015-0235 GHOST glibc gethostbyname 
# buffer overflow. http://crowdshield.com
#
# USAGE: python ghost-smtp-dos.py <ip> <port>
#
# Escape character is '^]'.
# 220 debian-7-7-64b ESMTP Exim 4.80 ...
# HELO
# 000000000000000000 ...
# Connection closed by foreign host.
#
# user () debian-7-7-64b:~# dmesg
# ...
# exim4[2562]: segfault at 7fabf1f0ecb8
#   ip 00007fabef31bd04
#   sp 00007fffb427d5b0 error 6 in





Figure 1: An snippet of an exploit PoC for the GHOST vulnerability that targets the
Exim mail server (https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/35951/). Exploit writers,
typically, leave comments on 1 tested environment and dependencies, 2 how to execute,
and 3 how to check if it succeeds, which are shaded in gray on the figure.
Table 1 shows possible problems encountered when reproducing PoC exploits. Such
practical barriers make exploits difficult to develop, faithfully test, or correctly share with
the community. Non-reproducible exploits have limited potential of being utilized in various
other applications that could benefit from publicly available PoC exploits. For example, the
reproducible PoC exploits can be used to evaluate existing mitigation techniques to see how
effective each technique is in defeating real exploits.
To solve this problem, we present XShop, a framework and infrastructure to describe and
share environments and dependencies for running PoC exploits in a formal way. XShop’s
flexible design enables new possibilities for utilizing these real, reproducible exploits. As a
demonstration, we build five practical use cases on top of XShop: easy community sharing
and reproduction of exploit PoC, as a security benchmark suite, for pen-testing, regression
testing, and to aid in authoring PoC. We design and implement these applications by
extending the XShop framework and demonstrate their effectiveness with twelve real world
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Table 1: Problems when running PoC exploits of wide-spread vulnerabilities.
CVE (Nickname) Difficulties Encountered
CVE-2015-0235 Wide adoption of partially fixed glibc
(GHOST) (2.17 to 2.18) among various distributions.
Required downgrade of major library.
CVE-2014-{6271,6277, Fixed across five different patches.
6278,7169,7186} (see Figure 3)
(Shellshock)
CVE-2013-6629 Highly non-standard installation.
(libjpeg memory leak) No actual PoC script released.
CVE-2014-0160 Configuring two machine environment:
(Heartbleed) an exploit runner and an SSL server.
CVE-2010-{4258,3849, Configuring machine with specific, old
3850} kernel. Ubuntu kernel patched before
(Full Nelson) upstream. Handling deadlock after success.
PoC exploits against well-known bugs that include GHOST, Shellshock and Heartbleed
in userspace and Full Nelson in the Linux kernel. We believe that XShop is not limited to
academic research, but has a potential to be grown as a community-wide knowledge base
because the proposed practices bring an immediate incentive to exploit writers (see §9).
In this paper, we make the following three contributions:
1. We design and implement XShop as an open-source framework and infrastructure to
develop, test and share exploits in a reproducible manner.
2. We demonstrate XShop’s effectiveness with five practical use cases: portable and
reproducible PoC exploits, security benchmark suite, pen-testing utility, regression
testing tool, and exploit authoring environment.
3. We evaluate XShop and its applications with a representative set of exploits that attack
5 vulnerabilities in applications and 7 vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel. We believe
XShop has significant potential to become a common practice to specify and share
PoC exploits, and also to grow as a community-driven knowledge base.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we discuss our motivation for
developing XShop. §3 presents its high-level overview. §4 shows a number of different use
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cases we built on top of XShop. §5 describes in detail our goals and XShop’s design. §6
shows XShop’s implementation. §7 illustrates a workflow by using the Heartbleed bug as
a running example. §8 evaluates XShop and the proposed applications by using real PoC
exploits. §9 discusses XShop’s limitation, envisions its potential as a community-driven
knowledge base, and provides XShop’s incentives for exploit authors. §10 compares our




In this section, we outline three motivating scenarios for reproducible exploit testing and
sharing. For each scenario, we describe existing difficulties and ways in which XShop can
mitigate these issues.
2.1 Reproducing Exploit Proof of Concept
When users set out to reproduce a published exploit PoC, they can be met with a number of
challenges. They must re-create the test environment, often from incomplete information.
This configuration can be further complicated by requiring specific software versions,
including system libraries or kernels.
Occasionally, the actual exploit is not published, only the attack vector. The user may
not be familiar enough with the vulnerability to follow this easily. If a script is provided, it
may have additional dependencies, or rely on a specific memory layout to work. Finally,
verification of the exploit may not be straightforward, the configuration process of the
author’s test environment may have inadvertently introduced the vulnerability, but this
cannot be seen to others.
This process of reproducing the original exploit PoC can be very time-consuming, and
must be repeated by any user who wishes to work with the PoC. Similarly, the original
author can benefit from automatic provisioning of test environments to their specification.
2.2 Research Applications
Currently, because of the time involved in reproducing many exploits, researchers find it
too cumbersome to validate their work with real world examples. Many papers make use
of artificially generated exploit examples such as RIPE [51]. These artificial examples are
5
certainly useful to evaluate textbook cases, but real world examples lend greater credibility
to the results because they often make use of corner cases or more creative attack vectors.
Ideally, published PoCs should be easily used in strengthening other areas of security
research.
To expand on this, an important component of experimentation is the control of test
variables. In a conventional scenario, one may be forced to manually configure several test
environments, attempting to reduce the variation between them. The ability to perfectly
re-create test environments, with some ability to introduce variation in a controlled manner,
would greatly improve the rigor of large scale experiments.
2.3 Isolation from Host System
Testing frequently involves running exploit code from untrusted sources online, installing
known-to-be-vulnerable software, and intentionally downgrading to make the system itself
vulnerable. It is certainly recommended as best practice that these tests are performed
in an isolated environment; however, the overhead and repetitiveness of configuring such
environments discourages this. A tool for automatically building many consistent test
environments would greatly reduce this overhead, and encourage users to tinker with




Figure 2 shows an overview of XShop. XShop consists of three components which are the
Build Manager, Exploit Driver and Hook Manager. The Build Manager supplies an isolated
and uniform environment to reproduce a given PoC. It manages virtual environments, installs
all dependent packages and a vulnerable target program, and launches the program if needed.
It is similar to the exploit writer’s comments about dependencies, however it automatically
constructs the environment for the user. In the case of the Heartbleed PoC the Build Manager
creates two virtual systems because Heartbleed is an attack with a server-client model. In
one system, the Build Manager compiles and configures the desired version of OpenSSL.




















for an exploit Exploit description Test configuration
An exploit
Isolated Env.
Figure 2: The overview of XShop’s design. To run an exploit for Heartbleed, XShop first
prepares a vulnerable virtual environment image (Target in the figure), after building a
specific version of OpenSSL (v1.0.1a). Then, it launches two virtual systems, namely
Attacker and Target, and runs the actual PoC to exploit the Heartbleed bug in the OpenSSL
library. In every phase of XShop, users can place hooks ( 1 - 4 ) to configure environment
settings or examine side-effects of the attack.
7
The Exploit Driver executes the exploit and validates whether the exploit was successful.
A success of the exploit can be verified in multiple ways. If an exploit is a memory leak
vulnerability, the number of returned bytes can be counted. If it is a control flow attack, we
can check whether a shell is spawned. In case of a privilege escalation attack, the uid of the
resulting process can be checked. The exploit driver corresponds with the execution and
validation chapter in Figure 1. In the case of Heartbleed (a memory leak vulnerability), the
exploit driver runs an exploit script in the attacking system, which sends crafted packets
to the target. It then receives output from the target and validates whether the exploit was
successful by measuring the returned packet size.
Lastly, the Hook Manager is responsible for placing hooks in multiple positions during
the test. By using these flexible hooks, XShop can use an exploit not only for replaying
the test, but also in many other applications. In §4, we will discuss several applications of




XShop’s flexibility allows it to be used in many different ways. It gives users the ability to
manage variables and automate the provisioning of test environments. In this chapter we
detail just a few of the many ways in which XShop can assist in security research.
4.1 Portable Exploit Evaluation Environment
As mentioned in §2, exploit writers are required to manually configure test environments
by carefully configuring physical or virtual machines with vulnerable software, a time
consuming, risky, and not easily reproducible process. With XShop, much of the repetitive
steps involved in this task can be automated, and authors only need to focus on the particulars
of their specific test. The authors can then publish these environments for others to use with
minimal additional effort.
Currently, when an exploit is published, it is accompanied by a vague description of
the test scenario and conditions. Each person who wishes to verify the results or review
the integrity of the test must reproduce this environment manually, perhaps making a lot
of inferences. With XShop, users simply download the few metadata files which describe
the test environment and XShop automatically builds an identical environment which does
not depend upon a specific host configuration. XShop therefore allows sharing of portable
environments such that many users across the web can quickly be on the same page whilst
evaluating a newly discovered vulnerability. This facilitates a more involved and stronger
community.
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4.2 Benchmark Suite to Evaluate Mitigation Schemes
A number of compiler-based mitigation techniques such as AddressSanitizer [44], CPI [25],
etc. [50, 45, 47, 27, 28] have been developed to prevent various types of vulnerabilities.
Authors of these techniques seek to validate their effectiveness via automated testing. Many
authors use automatic test generators such as RIPE [51], but often find it impractical to
test using real world exploits. This is due to the overhead involved in configuring test
environments, as each exploit may have a different set of conditions under which it succeeds.
Testing with real world examples can be very useful because they cover a wider and more
imaginative range of ways in which a vulnerability may be exploited than those used by
automatically generated tests.
XShop can be a powerful tool in these circumstances. Exploits published via XShop
come with their own test environment, eliminating this overhead and allowing authors to
focus on more thorough testing of their mitigation schemes. XShop additionally offers very
flexible control of the test procedure. This can allow for applying binary instrumentation (e.g.
Oxymoron [3], BinCFI [54]) or dynamic instrumentation (e.g. PIN [31], DynamoRIO [7])
techniques after compilation, but before the exploit is attempted, and actions to determine
the results within the test environment after the exploit attempt.
As a result, a developer of one of these techniques can assemble a battery of sample
vulnerabilities and quickly gather data on their tool’s effectiveness in guarding against such
attacks. We present such an evaluation of the mitigation strategies listed above in §8.
4.3 Penetration Testing
Penetration testing (pen-testing) involves examining real systems for vulnerabilities. Cur-
rently, it is very difficult to exactly duplicate target production machines, so pen-testers
are forced to take on the risk of attacking the actual machines, or attempt to recreate the
machine’s configuration manually.
XShop offers the user the ability to test for vulnerabilities in isolation. It can package an
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existing system’s environment into a container, allowing the user to conduct the test on a
duplicate of the original system. It also allows for testing of production containers or virtual
machine images. If desired, XShop can also launch the attack against a real remote host, as
with traditional pen-testing.
For system administrators, when faced with a zero-day exploit, they must quickly
determine which versions of the software used across their fleet are vulnerable in order
to minimize potential damage. Previously, they had to rely on the security community to
exhaustively test the software’s configurations or provision testing environments to conduct
the analysis themselves. In such time critical situations, this delay presents a serious risk.
XShop allows users to immediately test for zero-day vulnerabilities that are published as
an XShop project, with no additional effort by the original author. This allows pen-testers
and system administrators to quickly assess their vulnerability to newly published exploits,
without spending critical time setting up a test environment or waiting for a test to be
implemented in their testing suite of choice.
4.4 Analyzing Vulnerable Versions
When new exploits are discovered, it is important to evaluate the impact of the vulnerability
in terms of number of at-risk library versions. Application developers can explore the
vulnerable chapter of code using tools such as git bisect. With a proper understanding
of the vulnerability, they can quickly identify when a bug was introduced, and identify
vulnerable releases.
XShop can facilitate a similar exploration of the software, making it possible for the
security community to identify which versions of the software present in the population
are vulnerable. This is true even when there is only access to the installation package or
if there is no knowledge of how the exploit works internally. XShop can automatically
determine which versions of the affected software must be patched, without waiting for this
information to be reported by the developer.
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In §8, Figure 3, we show the results of such an exhaustive search in analyzing Bash
from version 3.0 to 4.2 against the Shellshock vulnerability. The figure shows that the
vulnerability was there before Bash 3.0 was developed, and sequentially patched for the
disclosed Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs). This ability to quickly figure out
the attack surface and immediately take measures to mitigate the impact of the vulnerability
is critical for system security when faced with zero-day exploit situations.
4.5 Regression Testing
When an upstream developer is ready to push the release version of the software, they
frequently run a full battery of unit and integration tests before submitting their changes.
Some projects which are especially concerned with security have additional test suites
to test against previously disclosed exploits of their software (e.g. Google Chrome [16],
Firefox [32], etc.), however, this is uncommon. With XShop, it is trivial for developers to
create a battery of test cases from published vulnerabilities and run them against a new




Motivated by the complexities of writing, sharing, and reproducing exploit PoC, we present
XShop, a tool and infrastructure that help exploit writers to set up a reproducible development
environment for PoC. In this section, we describe our goals and XShop’s design in detail.
5.1 Design Goals
To generate reproducible, yet flexible testing environments for PoC, XShop has four impor-
tant design goals as follows:
1. Portability. In order to reduce the time the community spends reproducing shared
test results, we want to implement XShop to build testing environments from minimal,
easily shared metadata files. This prevents the uploading and downloading of large
images. Additionally, these files should be logically organized so that it is easy to see
how the test environment is configured for a given PoC.
2. Automatic Provisioning. Using this metadata, XShop should be able to fully provi-
sion the test environment and run the exploit test, without assistance from the user.
This eliminates repetitive housekeeping tasks and allows the user to focus on their
research.
3. Isolated Environments. The test environments for PoC exploits should be isolated
from the host. This reduces the risk to the user from testing vulnerable software with
test code acquired from possibly untrusted sources.
4. Flexibility. Test environments should be identical between runs, but should allow
controlled variations. This permits rigorous testing of the impacts of such variations
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on exploit success, minimizing the impacts of other environment variables. Most
importantly, XShop should support various kinds of PoC exploits that include remote,
man-in-the-middle, and kernel attacks.
5.2 Project Description Format
To satisfy our requirement of portability, our design must include a compact project format
for sharing all the details of a PoC with the community. This format must include:
1. Dependencies. The exploit author must have a way to specify build and runtime
dependencies for the test, so that they are automatically resolved for the user.
2. Environment. The project must include all information necessary for XShop to
reproduce the test environment consistently across different hosts.
3. PoC. The exploit author must be able to store custom scripts which carry out the
exploit PoC.
4. Validation. The project must allow the exploit author to flexibly define a test proce-
dure for confirming the success of the PoC.
Once a project description is specified by an author, the rest of the tasks are coordinated
by XShop: setting up the testing environment, carrying out the PoC, and validating its result.
Furthermore, a variety of applications (see §4) can be built by using XShop due to its flexible
architecture, which we will discuss in the next section.
5.3 XShop Components
XShop consists of three major components, as shown in Figure 2: exploit driver, hook
manager, and build manager. These components allow XShop to construct an isolated
environment for reproducibly testing PoC exploit.
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5.3.1 Build Manager
The build manager interacts with the isolation provider (e.g. Linux containers, virtual
machines, etc.) depending on requirements specified by the author. It first populates one or
more images per each role (e.g., attacker or victim) for the isolation provider, and initiates
the building process to set up the test environment with proper configurations.
5.3.2 Exploit Driver
The exploit driver orchestrates the test procedure inside of the running test environment.
Once the dependencies are resolved, it first runs the PoC exploit and collects its results,
such as standard output and return code, for further investigation. In XShop, the return
code to indicate the success of a PoC exploit is well-structured (i.e., XSHOP_SUCCESS or
XSHOP_FAILED).
5.3.3 Hook Manager
The hook manager coordinates any custom activities which users other than the exploit
authors may wish to perform while testing a PoC exploit with XShop. For example, users can
easily replace the compilation options during the build process to evaluate compilation-based
defense techniques with the PoC. §8 and §4 show XShop’s applications in detail.
5.4 Controlled Variations
To allow controlled variations during the build or test procedures, XShop accepts a custom
configuration, called . It is similar in spirit to a shell script, but allows variations in a
controlled form to make sure all commands run as expected. In structure, XShopFile
consists of verbs that describe predefined actions (e.g., RUN and ADD), variables that represent
a set of permutations for build configurations (e.g., library and version), and minimal
control logic (e.g., a for-loop). It supports five verbs in total, as summarized in Table 2, and
is expressive enough to support all PoC exploits used for evaluations in §8.
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Table 2: A list of supported verbs in XShopFile.
VERB [argument+] Function
RUN [command] Runs command in the virtual environment.
ADD [path1] [path2] Copies the file at path1 within the build
context to path2 in the virtual environment.
WORKDIR [path] Performs all subsequent commands within
from the directory specified by path.
KERNEL [version] Restarts the virtual environment using the
specified kernel version, if supported.
FROM [image] Specifies the image from which the virtual
environment is built. Multiple providers
can be supported by using





XShop provides a number of Python modules and classes for easy extension, and consists of
approximately 1,500 lines of code. The complexity of each major component can be found
in Table 3.
Table 3: Components of XShop and their complexities in terms of their lines of code.
Component Lines of code
Command Line 42 lines of Python
XShop Internals 941 lines of Python
Default Project Files 108 lines of XShopFile, test
environment configuration, and
validation script boilerplate.
Docker Interface 184 lines of Python
Vagrant Interface 255 lines of Python
Total XShop 1530 lines of Python
6.1 Project Structure
A basic XShop project is shown in Example 1. These files are broken up into several
responsibilities: project settings, test environment, and test procedure. This set of files
allows the user to fully and flexibly define the test environment and procedure, and is
typically only a few kilobytes. The various formats are chosen to maximize the clarity of
the test environment and procedure for users, and isolate the responsibilities of each file as
much as possible.
6.2 Isolation of Testing Environment
XShop is designed to allow easy implementation of any isolation provider. It defines a small
set of methods (e.g. build_environment(), run_function(), launch_test(), etc.) so that
any provider can interface with XShop using a small Python class. Such classes have been
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1 |-config.yml ; Project configuration
2 |-containers ; Test system build contexts
3 | |-attacker
4 | | |-XShopFile ; Attacker build instructions
5 | |-target
6 | | |-XShopFile ; Target build instructions
7 |-test-environment.yml ; Test environment configuration
8 |-packages ; Stores installation packages
9 |-source ; Stores source archives
10 |-test ; Stores test dependencies
11 | |-xshop_test.py ; Test procedure
Example 1: A typical XShop project tree.
implemented to allow XShop to support containers [8] via Docker [13] and VirtualBox [37]
based virtual machines via Vagrant [18].
6.3 Source Management
XShop automatically manages installation files. Users are encouraged to place these files in
the source and packages directories, and use specific naming conventions. When a test is
run, the correct installation files are automatically made available in the build context.
6.4 XShopFile
To provide the aforementioned functionalities of XShopFile in §5, we extend Docker’s
configuration, called Dockerfile [14], by implementing our own parser. When reading a file,
a dictionary of template values is passed to the parser, which then utilizes Jinja2 [43] to
apply the template to the file contents. This also allows for control flow and loops within the
file. Example 2 illustrates these features in an example XShopfile.
6.5 API
To allow for more complicated experimentation, XShop exposes an API consisting of the
TestCase class, which represents a single test with fixed variable values, and a Trial class,
which allows managing full experiments in which multiple parameters can be varied. The





4 {% for d in builddependencies %}
5 RUN apt-get -y install {{ d }}
6 {% endfor %}
7
8 ADD {{ library }}-{{ version }}.tar.gz /home/
9 WORKDIR ~/ {{ library }}-{{ version }}
10 RUN ./configure --prefix=/usr
11 RUN make
12 RUN make install
13
14 WORKDIR ~/
Example 2: An example of XShopFile to specify the build process of a XShop project; the
code snippet shows a compilation procedure for OpenSSL.
6.6 Pen-Testing
To increase the utility of PoC exploits, XShop allows tests to be run on both remote hosts
and container or virtual machine images. Such testing is made possible with only minor




A CASE STUDY ON THE HEARTBLEED EXPLOIT
To further motivate the use of XShop, this section describes in detail the difficulties involved
for both exploit authors and users wishing to work with existing PoC, and how the workflow
can be improved with XShop. We describe this process for the Heartbleed [39] vulnerability.
CVE-2014-0160, better known as Heartbleed, is a vulnerability in the OpenSSL library
which is triggered by sending a crafted SSL heartbeat packet. The library responds with
a packet which contains too much data, including data from leaked regions of memory. A
number of researchers have demonstrated that it is possible to obtain a server’s private SSL
key through this vulnerability [35], indicating that this vulnerability is particularly critical.
This discovery forced a massive effort to patch OpenSSL and replace SSL keys across the
Internet, and indicated that it had been possible to decrypt SSL traffic with little trace since
the introduction of OpenSSL 1.0.1.
7.1 Exploit Authors
An author, wishing to write an exploit PoC for this suspected vulnerability, would desire
to set up a test environment with two systems, one running an OpenSSL server and the
other attacking, to demonstrate the remote exploit. This involves the uninteresting task of
booting two virtual machines and configuring one to respond to SSL requests using the
desired version of OpenSSL. To expand testing to additional versions of OpenSSL, or other
configurations, this task must be repeated in its entirety.
XShop automatically configures the virtual environment for the author, and allows them
to start with a fresh environment for each test. The author need only worry about the id-
iosyncrasies of configuring OpenSSL. The author can edit just a few lines of straightforward
configuration files and be up and running in seconds. Furthermore, switching to a different
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library version for testing is trivial.
7.2 Community Members
A user wishing to evaluate a Heartbleed PoC published as an XShop project simply down-
loads the few configuration files and is up and running with just a few keystrokes, completely
eliminating the time spent setting up their version of the test environment to match the
author’s. Furthermore, by inspecting the configuration file, they can see exactly how the
test is constructed, to verify that the original author did not inadvertently introduce the
vulnerability.
7.3 The XShopWorkflow
To demonstrate the minimal additional effort required by the exploit author, this section
outlines a typical process for authoring a PoC with XShop. We begin by creating a new
project with a command:
$ xshop new openssl Heartbleed
This creates a default XShop project from which to start. The next step is to edit the
additional metadata for the project in config.yml. This file includes information such as
where XShop can acquire source files used for the test and the default parameters used to
demonstrate the PoC.
Example 3 shows the config.yml file for the Heartbleed test. The simple proof of
concept test for the project checks the version before the patch (1.0.1f) and the version
right after the patch (1.0.1g) for vulnerability. The file lists two URL’s for source files.
Next, we list the public keys used to sign the files that the URLs point to. This data allows
XShop to automatically fetch the required source files so that new users may run the test.
This is achieved with xshop pull.
Next, the we tweak the XShopFile used to build the target OpenSSL server to match

















Example 3: Project configuration file (config.yml) for Heartbleed.
describes a client/server attack scenario, and so this file does not need to be modified.
We place basic self-signed certificates in the test folder so that they are available to the
OpenSSL server inside of the environment. Finally, we modify the test script to first launch
the server in the target machine, then launch the attack script supplied by the author from










10 subprocess.Popen(["openssl" " s_server"
11 " -key" " server.key"
12 " -cert" " server.cert5"









Example 4: An example test script that runs an OpenSSL server and coordinates the
Heartbleed exploit.
Within the run() function, we are given an object which allows us to script which
functions should be called, and in what virtual system. Only functions which return
XSHOP_SUCCESS or XSHOP_FAILED impact the results of the test. Helper functions, such
as start_server() which return normally are ignored unless there is an error. Here, the
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result of a separate exploit script is used to determine the success of the attempt.
Having written a test procedure and validation criterion, the author is now free to focus
on developing the exploit script, running xshop test each time they wish to view the results.
Example 5 shows a more extensive test, written with the XShop API, which verifies that
the bug was introduced with version 1.0.1a and patched in 1.0.1g.
1 from xshop import test
2
3 variables = {
4 ’version’: [’1.0.0r’, ’1.0.1a’, ’1.0.1b’, ’1.0.1c’,
5 ’1.0.1d’, ’1.0.1e’, ’1.0.1f’, ’1.0.1g’]}
6
7 T = test.Trial(variables)
8 T.run()
[Output]
Running Test: {’version’: ’1.0.0r’}, Safe
Running Test: {’version’: ’1.0.1a’}, Vulnerable
Running Test: {’version’: ’1.0.1b’}, Vulnerable
Running Test: {’version’: ’1.0.1c’}, Vulnerable
Running Test: {’version’: ’1.0.1d’}, Vulnerable
Running Test: {’version’: ’1.0.1e’}, Vulnerable
Running Test: {’version’: ’1.0.1f’}, Vulnerable
Running Test: {’version’: ’1.0.1g’}, Safe
Example 5: Evaluating the security of the eight OpenSSL versions against the Heartbleed
vulnerability by using XShop.
It is clear that with minimal additional effort, an exploit author has access to a much
more robust testing environment, with deterministic test results. They are able to expand the
scope of tests quickly, and eliminate repetitive test environment configuration. The rest of
the community enjoys immediate access to the same test environment, eliminating the task




In this section, we attempt to evaluate XShop by applying it to a number of use cases and
discussing its impact in each case. With these case studies, we hope to answer the following
questions:
1. What kind of real exploits can XShop support? (§8.1)
2. How realistic is the security benchmark suite that is built with XShop? (§8.2)
3. How effective is the pen-testing tool that is implemented with XShop? (§8.3)
4. How flexible are the hooking mechanisms that XShop provides? (§8.4)
5. How easy is it to write an exploit and its configuration for XShop? (§8.5)
8.1 Testing XShop with Real Exploits
XShop can handle various types of exploits because it allows for very flexible test configura-
tions. At a minimum, the author must provide some way of detecting the results of an exploit
attempt. XShop allows this detection to take place in any system within the test environment,
allowing for a wide variety of detection techniques. For example, in control-flow hijacking
vulnerabilities, the check can be done from the attacking system by examining the effect
of running shellcode or from the target system by monitoring for system signals such as
SIGSEGV or SIGILL. For an information leak vulnerability, the test can inspect the properties
of the return data (e.g. length, value, etc.) to determine whether the attack was successful.
Other types of bugs such as race conditions and logic bugs can be identified by return values
as well.
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Some exploits require a specific kernel version or the lack of kernel-based mitigation
techniques, such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). XShop supports the testing
of these exploits when the test environment is constructed using a virtual machine based
provider. Other providers, such as Docker, offer performance advantages but can not be
used for these tests.
In the rest of this section, we will describe the implementation of five different types of
exploits: leaking uninitialized memory, control-flow hijacking by stack overflow, logic bugs,
thread race conditions, and a kernel vulnerability. To present practicality of the work, we
use real world vulnerabilities (e.g. porting Metasploit module into XShop) if possible.
8.1.1 Leaking Uninitialized Memory
CVE-2013-6629 refers to a vulnerability in libjpeg in which uninitialized memory is leaked
when the library attempts to open a specially crafted JPEG file. To create a proof of concept
for this vulnerability, we wrote a test script based on the public disclosure [49] which
attempts to open and read such a crafted file. The library is considered to be vulnerable
if it returns image data as 16KB without error. This returned data is partially comprised
of uninitialized areas of memory. XShop was able to verify that versions 6b and 8 are
vulnerable, while version 9 correctly patched the vulnerability.
8.1.2 Control-flow Hijacking
Control-flow hijacking vulnerabilities are very common, and the most critical attack vec-
tor in the wild [12]. To demonstrate XShop’s ability to test such attacks, we selected
CVE-2010-4221, a vulnerability in ProFTPD.
CVE-2010-4221 refers to a stack overflow in ProFTPD which is triggered by a large
number of Telnet IAC commands. In the default configuration, SSP (Stack Smashing
Protector) needs to be bypassed. Since a stack cookie has 24bits of entropy in a 32bit
machine, and a stack cookie never changes until restarting the program, an exploit is
possible. For simplicity, we compiled ProFTPD without SSP and checked for a crash by
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monitoring the syslog. We considered a crash with SIGSEGV at the controlled eip to indicate
exploit success. An existing exploit is taken from a Metasploit module [15]. XShop can
verify CVE-2010-4221 affects ProFTPD version 1.3.2c.
In addition to the aforementioned example, we added another control-flow attack exam-
ple based on overwriting a C++ virtual function pointer. The example simulates a typical
use-after-free (UAF) attack, as it calls a different function than what it is supposed to call
when it uses the pointer. The example creates a C++ object and modifies the object’s virtual
function table with a fixed string printing function. It then triggers the modified virtual
function. If virtual function overwriting is possible, the program will output the pre-defined
string. By checking this, we can determine whether the exploit succeeds or not. We wrote
an exploit for the example program, and tested it using XShop. We will use this example for
demonstrating how a compiler-based control-flow integrity (CFI) (e.g. clang CFI) mitigation
techniques can be tested on XShop, in §8.4.
8.1.3 Logic Bugs
To demonstrate XShop’s ability to verify logic bug style attacks, we selected the Shellshock
family of bugs. This group of vulnerabilities allows an attacker to execute arbitrary com-
mands on an unpatched machine by taking advantage of bugs in how GNU Bash interprets
commands. We note that Shellshock was an extremely critical vulnerability when first
discovered and makes for a great example of XShop’s utility. Bash possesses a wide range
of versions and patches, many of which are used by various distributions.
We show how XShop can be used to produce a comprehensive set of tables which indicate
the vulnerability status of every combination of version, patch and CVE, automatically and
with minimal setup. In total, XShop built 262 different patch versions in a fully automated
fashion. Our results are presented in Figure 3.
The analysis shows that the CVEs for Shellshock were not all patched simultaneously,
and patches were applied in the same manner across all versions (see the pattern of edges
in red color). In addition to demonstrating support for testing implementation bugs, this
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Figure 3: Shellshock vulnerability by Bash version (horizontal axis) and patch (minor
version in vertical axis) for five major associated CVEs (sub-horizontal axis). The patterns
of vulnerable versions (colored in red) show that the vulnerability is successfully patched in
such sequence, in the same manner, regardless of major version.
evaluation gives some idea of the scale of testing that can be facilitated by XShop.
8.1.4 Race Conditions
A less common type of vulnerability involves the attacker taking advantage of a race
condition between threads in a multi-threaded program. As an example, we wrote a simple
program in which two threads are created which both attempt to write to a global variable.
We were able to verify that both threads executed in the test environment and were able to
modify the global variable, leading to unpredictable behavior. This race condition example
is explored further in §8.2.
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8.1.5 Kernel Vulnerabilities
To confirm XShop’s ability to evaluate kernel exploits, we wrote PoC tests for the “Full
Nelson” and “Half Nelson” privilege escalation attacks. To determine the success of the
exploit, we use the results of getuid(), in the same manner as the original exploit, but
modify the script to return XSHOP_SUCCESS or XSHOP_FAILURE instead of launching a shell.
We switch to Vagrant for the isolation provider, and begin with an unpatched Ubuntu 10.10
Server box. To perform each test, the box is upgraded or downgraded to the required kernel
version during the build phase when launching the test environment. XShop is able to verify
the posted version number in which the vulnerability was patched in the kernel.
8.2 Evaluating Mitigation Schemes
To illustrate XShop’s capabilities at managing multiple independent variables during testing,
we chose to evaluate various mitigation techniques offered by the Clang compiler. These
techniques are applied to some examples from the previous section to determine their
effectiveness.
To expand these vulnerability tests, a new dimension is added: compiler flag. We place a
hook which passes the flag for a given test to the compiler during the build phase. This hook
either instructs Clang to compile normally, or with the mitigation technique to be tested.
8.2.1 AddressSanitizer and SafeStack
To test the defense capability of AddressSanitizer [44] and SafeStack [25] against
CVE-2010-4221, we setup XShop to build a vulnerable version of ProFTPD with appropriate
compiler flags, -fsanitize=address and -fsanitize=safe-stack, to apply the protection.
Since the vulnerability is a typical stack buffer overflow, both mitigations successfully
defend against the vulnerability. AddressSanitizer crashes the program after detecting the
stack overflow vulnerability. For SafeStack, as it uses the correct return address even if the
value is overwritten, the program worked as if no attack took place.
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8.2.2 Memory Sanitizer
To test the ability of MemorySanitizer [47] to prevent reads of out of bounds memory, we
invoked it when compiling libjpeg for testing CVE-2013-6629. During the test, the library
begins to read the image as normal, and MemorySanitizer crashes the program when it
attempts to read the first out of bounds byte of memory. This shows that MemorySani-
tizer is very effective at explicitly preventing invalid reads. As a result, compiling with
-fsanitize=memory prevents the attack described in CVE-2013-6629.
8.2.3 Thread Sanitizer
To test if ThreadSanitizer (TSan) counters the race condition vulnerability, we used a simple
example [48], a typical race condition bug of accessing a global variable on two different
threads, without any lock. In the test, XShop automatically compiled a target program with
and without the compiler flag -fsanitize=thread. Since TSan terminates the program
with a non-zero exit code when it detects race condition, XShop can determine whether
TSan detects the race condition. In the test, XShop detects that the TSan-enabled binary is
terminated with a non-zero exit code, but the TSan- disabled binary was not. This shows
that TSan can detect a race condition in this sample program.
8.2.4 Evaluation
As a result of this suite of tests, we are able to validate the utility of several mitigation
techniques. In several cases, we can modify the XShop PoC for a real world exploit with
only a few lines of code, and immediately see the impact that the mitigation technique has.
While textbook exploit examples are certainly useful, there is also need to evaluate these
techniques with real world examples, which may take advantage of edge cases or unorthodox
strategies for carrying out the attack. XShop opens up these real world exploits to many
additional research applications, with no additional effort from the original exploit author.
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8.3 Adapting PoC for Penetration Testing
In this section, we evaluate XShop’s functionality for testing real world systems or system
images against existing PoC. We wish to demonstrate that PoC can be immediately used for
personal penetration testing, with no additional modification.
8.3.1 Remote Vulnerability Testing
To demonstrate remote testing ability, we configured a vulnerable server on Amazon Web
Services EC2 running with OpenSSL 1.0.1f compiled from source. We then ran XShop to
attack both this vulnerable server and an up-to-date web server. XShop confirmed that the
Amazon instance leaked information while the patched web server was invulnerable.
8.3.2 Local Vulnerability Testing
To demonstrate testing vulnerabilities on existing images, we use XShop to test two systems
for vulnerability to Shellshock by containerizing their existing file system. The first system
is a multiuser server that is used for research which has many different software packages
installed, runs Ubuntu 14.04 kernel 3.13, and is fully updated. Using XShop we could verify
that the server was not vulnerable to any of the published CVEs related to Shellshock. The
second system is a virtual machine running an unpatched Ubuntu 12.04 Live CD which
was produced roughly one month prior to the Shellshock discovery. XShop confirmed that
the system was vulnerable to all vulnerabilities listed in the Figure 3. These tests can be
performed on images of production servers, production container images, or containerized
clones of production file systems. They can be run very quickly, and required no modification
to the existing PoC.
8.4 Evaluating CFI Schemes with XShop
In this section, we demonstrate the flexibility of XShop’s hooking mechanism by using it




We share the result of our empirical analysis on binary instrumentation based CFI mitigation,
BinCFI, using XShop, to demonstrate XShop’s support for flexible test design. To test the
system, we configure XShop to build a sample binary with a stack overflow vulnerability,
then apply BinCFI to the executable.
The objective of this analysis is to figure out the properties of possible return targets
under the protection of BinCFI. We found that our sample exploit is still effective against the
executable that is instrumented by BinCFI. In the sample program, we successfully change
the return address of a main() function to an interim location of another function evil(),
to directly call system() to execute the shell command. Since BinCFI is a mitigation that
affects the control-flow of the program, an arbitrary change of return address is prevented
according to the original developer’s paper. To evaluate the property of possible return
targets, we chose to exhaustively search on the return address to figure out what kind of
return target is allowed from the vulnerability in the main() function of our sample program.
We setup XShop to test against a BinCFI instrumented binary for each instruction address
space. Since XShop can determine the success or failure of returning to the specified address
by watching for error messages printed by BinCFI instrumentations, XShop can catch
whether the address is allowed for a return target (runs correctly or throws segfaults on an
address other than the return target) or not (failed, if segfault happens at the return target
address).
From XShop test results, we find 14 reachable instructions, and can determine the
common characteristics of this address, that those instructions immediately follow call
instructions. As a result, we prove that, as the BinCFI paper mentioned, jumping to an
inter-instruction address is not possible (as it does not show on the target list), and it allows
all instructions right after a call instruction as a return target. Thus, the provided CFI
property is call-return target matching.
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8.4.2 Compiler-based Schemes
Compilers such as Clang and GCC provide CFI-like protection mechanisms especially to
prevent virtual function table overwrite. We evaluated these mechanisms with XShop. Unlike
the BinCFI example, we must use different binaries for each test, compiled with different
compilers and flags. As a result, the evil() function’s address is not consistent. Hooks
therefore select the compiler/flag for creating the target binary (clang++, g++, clang++ with
-fsanitize=cfi, g++ with -fvtable-verify=std), and then the target address is found and
passed to the exploit script during the test procedure. Example 6 shows our results. XShop
verifies that GCC’s virtual table verification and Clang’s CFI can prevent the virtual function
table overwrite in the example.
[Output]
Running Test: {’compiler’: ’g++’}, Vulnerable
Running Test: {’compiler’: ’clang++’}, Vulnerable
Running Test: {’compiler’: ’g++ -fvtable-verify=std’}, Safe
Running Test: {’compiler’: ’clang++ -fsanitize-cfi’}, Safe
Example 6: XShop result for compiler based CFI schemes. Since the address of evil()
varies, it needs to be extracted using a hook. The result shows that the virtual table
verification in GCC and the CFI in Clang can mitigate the exploit in the example.
8.5 Simplicity
Table 4 shows the number of lines of XShop test code required to implement real world
exploits. Since XShop can use any existing exploit framework, such as Metasploit and
CANVAS, or compiled script, or package manager, it is not necessary to write many lines of
code. Users simply have to modify the configuration (config.yaml), environment setup
(XShopFile) and test (xshop_test.py) files to match their needs. Since xshop_test.py
can call external modules, there is no restriction on exploit code language. For example,
we used a Python script in Heartbleed, a compiled C program for the GHOST and libjpeg
vulnerabilities, a Metasploit module for the ProFTPD vulnerability and a Bash script for
Shellshock.
32
Table 4: Five real exploits that we have tested with XShop. The right columns, marked C, D
and X, indicate additional lines of code, starting from a default project, that were required
test each exploit.
T CVE Nickname C. XF. X.
U CVE-2015-0235 [1] GHOST 10 6 11
U CVE-2014-6271 [46] Shellshock 20 8 9
U CVE-2013-6629 [49] libjpeg memory leak 8 13 14
U CVE-2010-4221 [41] ProFTPD stack overflow 10 4 13
U CVE-2014-0160 [39] Heartbleed 10 2 11
K CVE-2010-4258 [11] Full Nelson 8 3 8
K CVE-2010-4073 [21] Half Nelson 8 3 8
K CVE-2010-3301 [6] ia32syscall Emulation 8 3 8
K CVE-2010-3904 [10] Linux RDS Protocol 8 3 8
K CVE-2012-0056 [55] Mempodipper 8 3 8
K CVE-2013-2094 [2] perf_event_open 5 3 10
K CVE-2015-1328 [42] Ubuntu OverlayFS 5 3 11
C: config.yaml, XF: XShopFile, X: xshop_test.py,
T: Type, K: Kernel, U: Userspace
A significant portion of the time spent implementing a PoC is spent on the peculiarities
of configuring the target library and determining the most reliable method for determining
whether the exploit succeeded. These tasks are an unavoidable part of general exploit
authoring. With XShop, the repetitive, manual configuration process is entirely skipped.
This evaluation demonstrates the simplicity of authoring a new PoC, and getting up to
speed with a newly published PoC. With the entire project described in around 50 lines of
code, many of which are common between projects, simple shell commands, or Python





In this section we discuss some observations from the evaluation process. In particular, we
note some key things that PoC authors must keep in mind when developing with XShop.
Finally we address any limitations which were noticed during the evaluation phase.
9.1 Observations
9.1.1 Deterministic Build Process
XShop is very useful for creating reliable PoCs, by eliminating a large amount of variation
in the test environment. The highly consistent process for constructing the environment
means that fragile exploits can still work when tested by other users.
For most cases, sourcing dependencies from a distribution’s package manager is suffi-
cient. Some exploits are especially sensitive to changes (e.g. Return-oriented Programming,
ROP). Installed packages may be updated in the repository, and the author may wish to
source them from a static file instead, to prevent changes in the future. The base image may
be updated by the maintainer and the exploit author must supply their own. Non-determinism
can be introduced at compile time, and deterministic build tactics such as those developed
by the Tor Foundation [38] and the Debian project [29] must be used. All of these methods
are left to the author’s discretion and are fully supported by XShop.
9.1.2 Test Criterion
Another important consideration is that XShop only returns the results of the test specified
by the user. If the test if flawed, then the results will be flawed. For instance, say a user
wishes to evaluate a mitigation scheme against a static ROP exploit (e.g. it attempts to jump
to a hard coded address). A mitigation technique which simply changes the memory layout
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of the target by a few bytes will break the attack. The author must be able to recognize that
the mitigation technique did not actually patch the vulnerability.
9.1.3 Incentive to Exploit Writers
The last two sections outlined a number of responsibilities which exploit writers will have
when authoring PoC. For authors, XShop reduces the work involved in setting up specific
test environments, but does not reduce their responsibility to ensure that their test properly
validates the exploit. We would, however, like to provide some additional justification for
XShop’s use by exploit authors:
1. XShop does not add significant overhead to the existing exploit authoring process.
Once a reliable test environment is established, it is easy to configure XShop to match.
2. XShop completely eliminates the repetitive task of provisioning the test environment,
and is therefore far more useful to the community, allowing for more widespread use
of the PoC.
3. XShop projects provide a more transparent view of the test environment, making
debugging easier.
4. XShop test environments are isolated and freshly built for each test, preventing con-
tamination of the test from previous tests or the host.
5. Distributing a PoC as an XShop project can reduce the number of variables which
must be accounted for by the author. They are free to make the test environment as
static as they like.
9.2 Limitations
9.2.1 Support for Other Operating Systems
While XShop supports the virtualization of a variety of operating systems via VirtualBox,
the automated build process relies on SSH and is tailored to a Linux environment. The
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modular provider interface, however, would make introduction of a provider with support
for other operating systems, such as Windows, straightforward.
9.2.2 Bootstrapping Community
We believe that the real benefit that XShop could provide depends on adoption by the
community. There are a number of advantages that would come from a large database
of ready to use XShop exploit PoCs. Before this is possible, infrastructure is required for





XShop is related to several previous works in the field, including deterministic packaging
and building portable programs, system isolation mechanisms, benchmarking tools for
exploit mitigation techniques, and pen-testing tools. In this section we discuss each in detail.
10.1 Deterministic Packaging and Compilation
When building victim environments, XShop needs a mechanism for resolving library de-
pendencies. There are a number of preexisting works which tackle this problem. Package
managers, such as nix, apt, yum, etc., are very mature technologies for managing the
installed libraries on various distributions of Linux. As XShop uses a Debian container
in its default test image, we applied apt as our default package manager. For resolving
runtime dependencies, CDE [17] solved the challenge of identifying dependent libraries by
system call introspection and it has the capability of automatically constructing the runtime
environment. These mechanisms are orthogonal to XShop, that is, CDE can be used as a
dependency resolver in XShop without any conflicts.
10.2 Benchmarking Exploit Mitigation
XShop can be compared to benchmarking toolkits for exploit mitigation techniques, such
as RIPE [51]. RIPE provides several exploit test cases to measure the effectiveness of
constructed defense mechanisms by applying the mechanism to those cases and attempting
an attack. A significant difference between RIPE and XShop is that, while RIPE can only
test the system against automatically generated samples that contain a vulnerability and
its exploits, XShop can directly use real world exploits. From the modules of pen-testing
tools (e.g. Metasploit [36], and CANVAS [19]), XShop can set up a test environment for
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executing a full-fledged target application and test mitigation mechanisms against its real
exploits.
Similar to RIPE, XShop is designed to support both compiler and post-compilation (e.g.
binary, link time, etc.) instrumentation techniques. Examples of such supported mechanisms
are, for compiler instrumentations, LLVM [26] based SoftBound+CETS [33, 34], Address-
Sanitizer [44], DangNull [27], SafeDispatch [20], CAVER [28], MemorySanitizer [47],
ThreadSanitizer [45], CFI [50], CPI [25], etc. For the binary instrumentation tools, we
present a working example with BinCFI [54], but there is no limitation to prevent support of
Oxymoron [3], StackArmor [9], CCFIR [53], etc.
10.3 Pen-Testing
XShop can help various pen-testing tools to build environments in which to test its pre-built
exploit modules. Metasploit [36] and CANVAS [19] are examples of such pen-testing suites.
Traditionally, pen-testers are required to setup their environment to write or test such exploit
modules, but XShop can setup this environment on their behalf, and then directly execute
the exploit modules inside of the isolated test containers to evaluate their performance.
For providing a similar pen-testing environment, there is a Linux distribution called Kali
Linux [22] which offers a unified, preset environment for penetration testers. However, this
only provides the environment for the attacking machine, and cannot set up example target
machines.
10.4 Containers
XShop requires a mechanism to create an isolated environment which is independent from
the configuration of the host. Virtual machines that run on top of the host can be used in
this fashion. There are a number of implementations of such virtual machines, including
Xen [4], KVM [24], QEMU [5], and Virtualbox [37]. These VM based environments come
with a the cost of overhead, as they typically require additional time to build and launch the
environment, and have multiple levels of world switch (i.e. ring -1 and 0), as well as the
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inherent overhead in virtualizing the hardware that is presented to the guest OS. There are
more light-weight containers based on namespace [30] isolation in Linux such as LXC [8]
and Docker [13], as well as MBox [23], which provide a thinner filesystem sandbox that
can configure the runtime environment of an application [52]. XShop implements container
based isolation with Docker for most cases, but can also use VirtualBox VM with Vagrant




Proof-of-concept exploits are seldom reproducible because our community lacks a formal
way to specify the tested environment or resolve dependencies. In this paper, we present
XShop, a framework and infrastructure to describe environments or dependencies for PoC
exploits in a formal way, thereby automatically resolving dependencies and constructing an
isolated sandbox for exploit development and testing. On top of XShop, we build five practi-
cal use cases that utilize reproducible exploits of well-known bugs such as Heartbleed and
Shellshock; the use cases include security benchmarking, pen-testing, exploit development,
sharing PoC with the community, and regression testing, all with real exploits. We believe
that the proposed practice not only brings immediate incentives to exploit writers but also
has the potential to be grown as community-wide knowledge base.
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